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Durham is the pits (for local disproportionality)
Disproportionality is the degree of mismatch between parties’ shares of votes and their shares of seats, with
measures of disproportionality usually calculated for national elections. The share of votes is simply the share
of all votes cast nationwide, and the share of seats is simply the share of all seats contested. Dr. Chris
Hanretty of the University of East Anglia uses this model to show us that Durham is the worst place in the
country to live – if only in this particular respect. 
There is, however,
nothing in the concept
of  disproportionality which prevents us f rom calculating measures of  disproportionality by aggregating over
dif f erent units.
We could calculate a measure of  disproportionality f or the single constituency. (That is, we could
ref use to aggregate).
Such a measure would be extremely boring. It would simply tell us the share of  the winning candidate. High
measures of  disproportionality would actually correspond to quite competit ive (three-way or f our-way)
contests.
We could calculate a measure of  disproportionality f or single constituencies, aggregating over t ime.
Thus, we could, f or each constituency, calculate the share of  votes won over the past f our or f ive
elections, and the share of  occasions upon which each party has won the seat.
Such a measure would be similar in spirit to tallies of  seats which have not changed parties over the past
twenty years. High measures of  disproportionality would correspond to seats which (almost) never change
hands.
We could calculate a measure of  disproportionality f or regions, aggregating over space. Instead of
summing the votes cast nation-wide, we could sum the votes cast and seats won in each region.
This would give us a measure of  disproportionality f or each region. This measure of f ers something more
than a decomposition of  national- level disproportionality: hypothetically, pure proportionality could be
achieved even if  disproportionality was high in every region, as long as those regions were equally balanced
between the parties.
Measures of  disproportionality which aggregate over (local) areas are important, but f or some purposes
they might be inadequate. We might want f iner-grained measures of  disproportionality which apply at the
constituency- level, rather than taking each constituency within the region as interchangeable. If  my
constituency is on the border between a region with high disproportionality (say, the East of  England) and a
region with low disproportionality (say, the Greater London area), my voting behaviour might be dif f erent
f rom someone who is in another constituency at the centre of  that region.
We can use inf ormation on constituency geography to solve this problem, and of f er a f ine-grained picture
of  disproportionality aggregating over space but simultaneously providing a constituency-based measure.
The idea is simple: f or each constituency, identif y the twenty `closest’ constituencies (including the
constituency itself ). Then f or each party calculate the share of  seats and share of  votes won, and use this
in a measure of  disproportionality. Adjacent seats will have similar measures of  local disproportionality
(their lists of  closest constituencies will have many members in common), but we will be able to identif y
local `peaks’ and `troughs’ of  disproportionality.
I’ve constructed such a measure on the basis of  2010 general election results. If  you are so minded, you
can see the R code that I used to generate the measures (the data can be f ound here). That code makes a
number of  technical details explicit.
I’m using the Gallagher measure of  disproportionality, rather than any other. I’m also def ining the `closest’
constituencies as those constituencies the centroids of  which have the smallest Euclidean distance to the
centroid of  my target constituency. The centroid of  a given constituency is simply the centre of  mass of  the
constituency — the point f rom the constituency would hang level if  you picked it up with a piece of  string
(or a huge crane). The centroid might not represent the centre of  the constituency population — but it is an
easy and (I think) def ensible measure.
The map of  disproportionality that results is shown above.
Darker values indicate greater disproportionality. Starting with areas with low levels of  disproportionality, we
can see two peaks — a massive spike in London, which stands out much more thanks to the levels of
disproportionality in the surrounding Home counties, particularly Kent — and another second peak in
Bristol. This second peak f lattens out much more gradually.
Moving on to areas with high levels of  disproportionality, we see not only the af orementioned ring around
London, but also a great ravine cutting across the country f rom Liverpool through Manchester on to
Doncaster. A more localised area of  high disproportionality is f ound in the north East, centred on City of
Durham, which has the highest levels of  disproportionality. Further north still, the Central Belt sees high
disproportionality stretch f rom Ayr to Edinburgh.
An ideal but myopic voter who cared about disproportionality in the surrounding region would theref ore
move to the South West, and avoid the Home Counties or the North East. Of  course, it ’s rare to f ind
voters who care about disproportionality per se rather than the impact of  disproportionality on their
f avoured party. But the approach used here could easily be applied to create local advantage ratios f or
each constituency. Such measures of  disproportionality and advantage could be usef ul in studying the
detailed operation of  tactical voting.
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